Made, Not Born: Why Some Soldiers Are Better Than Others

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"Made, Not Born: Why Some Soldiers are Better than Others"

Why do the combat capabilities and performance of combat personnel vary? Do democracies produce better soldiers? Do rich countries? Do regimental systems? Or are some people just born better soldiers?

 

The first chapter examines domestic political explanations. Some “democratic victory theories” argue that democracies produce better commanders, superior strategies, more motivated personnel, or better-managed personnel. Yet autocracies also have advantages in these areas. What is going on below the regime level?

 

Chapter two examines theories of combat personnel management, the most well-known of which are regimental theories. Regimental theories assert that decentralized personnel management should provide units with the opportunities and incentives to properly condition their troops in the extrinsic resources desired. Critics claim that regimental systems are inefficient and obstruct centralized quality control. They may also deny the importance of group- or unit-level attributes such as cohesion, which regimental theories claim as features of regimental systems. Implicitly, regimental theories emphasize extrinsic resources, whilst centralized systems manage personnel by their intrinsic resources. How can personnel management achieve the best of both worlds?

 

Chapter three examines theories of force employment, command, leadership, and decision-making, which are grouped together as largely cognitive skills. Chapter three finds that the literature generally associates good armies with intrinsically gifted “strategists” at the top of the organization. But how do we explain good soldiers at more junior levels? 

 

Chapter four examines resistance to stress and cohesion. Chapter four finds an enduring prescription that militaries should select-in those who are intrinsically resistant to stress; however, few humans are immune to combat stress. Chapter four then finds that the military studies literature over-states the importance to cohesion of homogenous intrinsic attributes. How does an organization manage stress and promote cohesion?

 

Chapter five examines combat motivation. Chapter five finds a pervasive assumption in the literature that soldiers are intrinsically motivated to fight; however, motivations to serve are not transitive with combat motivations. How do we sustain the soldier's motivations once the shooting has started?

 

Chapter six examines combat athleticism and special operations capabilities. Chapter six finds a tendency in the literature to associate these attributes with the most observable physiological attributes, such as body mass and the male gender. What is the role of personnel management in conditioning and sustaining soldiers?

 

Chapter seven concludes the book by summarizing the research and making suggestions for policy and further research. Soldiers are made more than born. Yet it is surprising how often the assumptions and commentary assume the converse. In fact, intrinsic attributes do not naturally produce soldiers. Instead, they produce a military population that is unrepresentative at best and insular at worst. Soldiers require careful personnel management if they are to acquire and retain the peculiar attributes required in combat.

Relevant previous publications by the Same Author:

“The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation.” Journal of Strategic Studies, December 2003, vol. 26, no. 4.
 
"Don't Get Your Mass Kicked: A Management Theory of Military Capability." Defence and Security Analysis, June 2003, vol. 19, no. 2.
 
Assessing the Effects of Unit Stabilization on Soldier and Unit Outcomes, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, DRR-3882-A, July 2006. With Bryan W. Hallmark, Barbara Raymond, Thomas F, Lippiatt, Jeffrey Peterson, Brian Gifford, Claude M. Setodji, Patricia K. Dey, and Kristin Leuschner. (Not publicly released)
 
“Women, Minorities and War: The Impact of Wartime Mobilization on Political Rights in Europe, 1900-1955.” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association 1999. With David L Rousseau.
 
“Expatriate Games: Interorganizational Coordination and International Counterterrorism.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, January-February 2006, Vol. 1, No. 29, pp. 75-89.

Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MG-481, February 2007. With Brian Jackson, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, John Parachini, William Rosenau, Erin M Simpson, Melanie Sisson, and Donald Temple. 

Near-Term Options for Improving Security at Los Angeles International Airport, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, DB-468-1-LAWA, October 2004. With Donald Stevens, Terry Schell, Tom Hamilton, Richard Mesic, Michael Scott Brown, Edward Wei-Min Chan, Mel Eisman, Eric V. Larson, Marvin Schaffer, John Gibson and Elwyn Harris